Abstract-In service based systems, there is often a need to replace services at runtime as they become either unavailable or they no longer meet required quality or security properties. In such cases, it is often necessary to build compositions of services that can replace a problematic service because no single service with a sufficient match to it can be located. In this paper, we present an approach for building compositions of services that can preserve required security properties. Our approach is based on the use of secure composition patterns which are applied in connection with basic discovery mechanisms to build secure service compositions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In service based systems (SBS) -i.e., systems that provide their functionality by orchestrating external software services outside their own control and ownership -there is often a need to replace services which become unavailable or no longer meet required quality (e.g., performance) or security properties (e.g., confidentiality, availability, privacy) at runtime. In such cases, sometimes it is not possible to find single substitute services for the one which should be replaced. A possible way for addressing such cases is to attempt to build a composition of services that could replace the problematic service.
A fundamental challenge associated with such cases is the need to ensure that all security properties, which are required from an SBS and have to do with the service to be replaced, are taken into account whilst identifying suitable compositions.
Addressing security properties in runtime service composition has received little attention in the literature (e.g., [9] [10] ) and, to the best of our knowledge, existing work does not provide a comprehensive solution to the problem. The work we present in this paper is aimed at addressing this gap.
Our approach is based on patterns of service composition that are known to preserve certain security properties and can be applied at runtime in order to find secure service compositions. These patterns specify abstract and parametric specifications of service workflows, preconditions for their Luca Pino is with City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK (corresponding author; email: Luca.Pino.1@city.ac.uk).
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application and security implication rules. These rules express formally proven logical implications between security properties and, during the composition process, they are used to infer the security properties which would need to be satisfied by individual services in order to guarantee some other security property required of the composition as a whole.
Once identified the security properties required of individual services within a composition are fed into a discovery tool which identifies candidate services that satisfy the properties.
The approach that we present in this paper extends a tool that has been developed at City University to support the discovery of services at runtime based on criteria referring to the interface (i.e., inputs and outputs), behaviour and quality properties of services [17] . This tool supports runtime discovery in two modes: a reactive and a proactive mode. In the reactive (or "pull") mode, services are discovered only when a need for them arises. In the proactive (or "push") mode, service discovery queries are provided to the tool for each of the constituent services of an SBS. These queries are executed in parallel with the operation of an SBS to identify and maintain up-to-date sets of candidate services that could be used to replace the constituent services of the SBS when any of them fails. The push mode has been shown to improve significantly the efficiency of the discovery process [17] . Service composition should also be applied in push mode as it is computationally expensive and cannot be expected to produce timely results if applied reactively.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we present a scenario for service composition which we use in the rest of the paper to exemplify our approach. In Sect. III, we introduce the secure service composition patterns. In Sect. IV, we describe the process of applying these patterns to generate compositions that preserve security properties. Finally, in Sect. V we overview related work and in Sect. VI we provide some concluding remarks.
II. SCENARIO
To exemplify our approach, in the rest of the paper we use a scenario where a composition of services needs to be built in order to replace a service S acting as a broker for car hire companies and providing quotes for hiring cars. S takes as input the profile of a driver (i.e., a parameter of type Person) and produces a personalized offer based on car hire companies that are within a given distance of the driver's address. A security property regarding S is that the confidentiality of any input information passed to it must be preserved as it contains personal driver information (i.e., his/her fu birth and address).
Our approach assumes that in an SBS designers must have specified a query Q S that to find a replacement of S if S become malfunctions at runtime. At runtime, if aft there is no single service matching Q S composition that could replace S should be fo of a composition in this case could invol CompanyLoc and BrowseOffer. In th CompanyLoc is a car hire company locator input the address of person, who needs to returns the closest car hire companies t BrowseOffer gets quotes for hiring cars f companies and enables their browsing.
To preserve the confidentiality of driv example, all the data that is passed to Compa any information that is derived from these da passed from CompanyLoc to BrowseOffer any of these services should remain confident III. SECURE COMPOSITION PATT Our approach uses secure composition pat process of constructing secure workflows of s composition pattern specifies an abstract elem of activities, that should be provided by indiv further compositions of services), and the c flows connecting these activities. An elementary workflow is the sequential wo services are composed in chains and invoke achieve the required functionality outcome [1 In addition to the actual workflow, a sec pattern specifies: (a) the overall security pro workflow can ensure subject to the security services bound to the individual activities in conditions that must be satisfied in orde workflow, and (c) dependencies between outputs of the different activities of the work as IO dependencies in the following).
Two examples of secure composition patte The security properties of a secu used in order to check the applicab the service composition process. In retrieved and applied during the sea Sect. IV) only if the security proper with the security properties specified the service that the composition is selection of a secure composit application of the pattern, its IO querying conditions for discovering the individual activities in the patter
The ability of a pattern to guaran included in its specification depen activities of the pattern may perfor the pattern. To ensure the confiden sequential pattern, for example, it i the confidentiality of the data trans out A ), and (b) the confidentiality of d A ) if out A and d A may disclose in consequently IN) and A derives any express such conditions regarding th properties, it is necessary to spe activities or the individual service perform on data. These actions are security-related actions. In some cases the actions performed on data are specified for the individual activities at the pattern level. In the sequential pattern of Fig. 1 , for example, it is specified that activities A and B store data (see Store(d A ,S 1 ) and Store  (d B ,S 2 ) ). In other cases, however, the pattern itself might not specify conditions about the actions that its abstract activities may perform on data.
As discussed earlier, the ability of a pattern to guarantee certain security properties depends on the actions that the individual services, which will be bound to the activities of the pattern, perform on the data and the security properties that hold for these individual services. These dependencies are expressed by security implication rules.
As an example, consider the confidentiality property. A security implication rule should express that, if the data D, used in an activity A as an input or an output, is derived from another data D', that was required to be confidential for some action A', and the derivation of D from D' can disclose some property of D', then the confidentiality of D in A is required. Security implication rules are specified as part of composition patterns only if their validity is formally proven. Proofs of security implication rules must have been constructed offline prior to the publication of a secure composition pattern and the use of the pattern in the service discovery and composition process. This is necessary as any attempt to construct proofs of rules at runtime, or equivalently, derive dependencies between security properties of aggregate workflows and individual workflow services from first principles is computationally expensive and, thus, impractical to do over and over again every time that the discovery process tries to instantiate a specific part of a workflow. Hence, we assume that the security implication rules have been formally proven before becoming part of the specification of a pattern and can therefore be safely used to infer the security properties of individual services when the pattern is applied. The process of constructing proofs of security implication rules is beyond the scope of this paper but interested readers may find examples of such proofs in [4] .
To specify the security implication rules in patterns we use Situation Calculus (SC) [5] . SC is a first order logic (FOL) language introduced originally to model and reason about dynamical domains. In particular, SC may be viewed as a dialect of FOL, were the predicates that can have different truth values are called fluents. Each fluent is evaluated against a specific sequence of actions passed to them, called situation.
The specification of security implication rules assumes that secure composition patterns and the information of the instantiated services in the workflow are also expressed in SC 1 . In particular, we use • the fluent next(A,A') to specify that an activity A is followed by an activity A' in the workflow of a pattern • the fluent input (A,D) (output(A,D) ) to specify that D is an input (output) of activity A • the security-related actions of services • the fluent known(P, S) to specify that the security property P is already known to be satisfied (certified) in situation S. In this model the situations are the different traces of the workflow, and currAct(A) is the valid fluent when the reasoning step is on activity A. The reasoner walks through the workflow and at each step it is possible to check which security properties are required through the fluent requires(P,S). 
poss(step(A),S)↔ currAct(A',S) ∧ next(A,A')

SUCCESSOR STATE currAct(A,do(α,S))↔ α = step(A) requires(conf(A,D),do(α,S))↔[α = step(A) ∧ (input(A,D) ∨ output(A,D)) ∧ known(conf(A',D'),S) ∧ derive(D',D, ε) ∧ ε ≠ ∅ ∧ A' ≠ A] ∨ [α ≠ step(A) ∧ requires(conf(A,D),S)]
Table II shows the specification in SC of the security implication rule that we introduce informally above. The first two rules are general rules that specify how the situation evolves. The actual rule for the confidentiality property is the third one, and it basically follows the explanation from before (the only addition is the part after the disjunction and it is a common solution to the frame problem in SC).
Whilst applying a security composition pattern, the activities in the pattern should be instantiated based not only in finding services that match with the IO dependencies of the pattern but also with security conditions that may be associated with the particular activity. The exact security conditions required for each activity are inferred from: (a) the security properties that the composition which is being built by the pattern must satisfy, (b) the set of services that have been already bound to activities of the pattern and the actions that these services perform on data, and (c) the security implication rules.
Security implication rules state which security properties would be required of the individual activities within a pattern in order to guarantee that a given security property of the composition defined by the pattern as a whole will also hold.
The process of deriving the security properties that should hold for the individual services that can be bound to a pattern is discussed in Sect. IV below.
IV. COMPOSITION PROCESS
The composition process focuses on bui through the application of the secure comp This process starts when no single replacem been found for a service S that needs to be d SBS and it is initially driven by the same disc that has been specified by the SBS design single service discovery for S. More specific security conditions are collected from Q S composition patterns that are known to gu properties satisfying these conditions are retr pattern is found, then no replacement can be f For each of the retrieved patterns, the pro services that could be bound to each of the pattern. The search for candidate services may start from the initial or final activity of an appropriate service for this activity is fou partially instantiated by binding the locate activity and then searching for bindings to t are neighbors of the one of the instantiated a than one candidate services are found for the c different instantiation of the pattern is created of these services to the current activity and process continues by considering each of instantiations.
The security conditions required of the c for an activity during the search are determi the candidate services based on all the condit those related to security. This is because se may also depend on the actions that the serv bound to an activity perform, as we discussed
In the case of SSP, for example, if the con inputs IN to the workflow that will be created required, and a candidate service S for the workflow is known to derive its output data inputs passed to it (in A ) in a way that discl about these data (i.e., it is known that S per Derive(in S ,out S ,{Type(in S )}), then two se properties will be required of S: (i) the con input data (conf(S,in S )) and (ii) the confiden data (conf(S,out S )). The second condition wou be required if S did not derive its outputs from derivation of its outputs did not disclose any i in S . Note that in this example, without re conditions, to be a valid candidate service for to store some data d S to an internal data stor was also known to be derived from the inputs known that S performs the actions Derive(i and Store(d S ,L S ) then the confidentiality of th of S, i.e. (conf(S,D) ), would also be required f candidate for A.
During the composition process, the conditions to be checked for a candidate serv are derived from the IO dependencies of the actions that the service performs, usin implication rules of the pattern being applie whether the service complies with the se S ilding workflows position patterns. ment service has discovered for an covery query (Q S ) ners to drive the cally, initially, the and the secure uarantee security rieved. If no such found for S. ocess tries to find e activities of the for each activity the pattern. Once und the pattern is ed service to the the activities that activities. he persistent data for S to be a valid exact security vice of an activity e activity and the ng the security ed. The check of ecurity properties required from it is based on securi some independent authority and pub [16] . Such certificates also confirm performs on data.
As an example of the applicatio the example introduced in Sect. II composition to replace the car hir pattern that can guarantee the con profile that will be given as input SSP pattern. The query to instantia will then just require a service who input provided to S or, equivalentl data type which is a supertype of the Suppose that the discovery for returns the service CompanyLoc. Th instantiated with this service (see F complies with the security conditio pattern. In particular the initial sec that Person should be confiden implication rules will infer that CompanyLoc's input Address is also projection of Person. Furthermo CompanyLoc, namely BranchInfo, i Address data and can potentially rev Area part of the address, BranchInf be confidential. This inference wou Table II, assuming that the BranchInfo, {Area}) is specified i description of CompanyLoc.
Subsequently, the query for the s is built. The IO dependencies of SS B is a subset of Person+BranchInf required for the replacement of S an rules would then require that Perso confidential.
Suppose that a service called B BranchID from BranchInfo, is implication rules can then infer t confidential (as a projection of Bran 3(b), the prices that BrowseOffer persistent store don't need to be con by the certificate of BrowseOffer, BranchID but don't disclose any inf
If the search for a service for Fig. 3 . Example of progressive pattern in must be confidential according to security im ity certificates, created by blished in a service registry m the actions that a service n of this process consider I and the generation of a re quotation service S. A nfidentiality of the driver to this composition is the ate the first activity in SSP ose input is a subset of the y, a service with an input e input data type of S.
the first activity of SSP he activity A of SSP is then Fig. 3(a) ), if CompanyLoc ons derived for it from the curity condition for S was ntial. Thus, the security t the confidentiality for o required, as the latter is a re, since the output of s derived from the driver's veal information about the fo will also be required to uld be made by the rule of action Derive(Address, n a certificate within the second activity of SSP (B) SP require that the input of fo. The security properties nd the security implication on and BranchInfo must be rowseOffer, requiring just located. The security that BranchID should be nchInfo). As shown in partially instantiated pattern fails, the com attempts to apply some composition patter order to find a composition of services that c the activity of concern. This recursion may g workflows as indicated in Fig. 4 . 
V. RELATED WORK
Research dealing with security in service focused on the verification of the secu compositions through model checking [6] [7 however, is different since we are lookin composition patterns that are proven to gu properties as part of a runtime service composition process.
A work that is more related to ours is [9] techniques are used to compose workflows th with some lattice-based access control models secure systems). The focus of [9] is how algorithms for sequential workflow plann approach is more general w.r.t both the typ and the security properties that it covers.
In [10] the authors describe an appro conscious web service composition through m constraints required for service provision declared by service providers. The security c approach are specified in SAML [11] . In [10 compositions are generated based upon s domain specific business workflows, whil allows the generation of arbitrary workflows.
Other works on automatic service co [2] [12][13] [14] ) allow the expression of secu discovery queries, usually as non-functional approaches focus on specific types of securi check them only against single services without addressing the overall security of a co Aniketos project [15] also uses secure com (i.e. sets of rules) and checks them composition plans. Aniketos patterns d configurations leading to either secure or in and are used after the composition proces required security policy applies. In our w check is performed during the composition pr Finally, our secure service composition pa to the workflow patterns in [3] as they sp workflows that can be used to generate servi However, our patterns include additional security properties. In this paper, we have presented a identification of secure service c runtime service discovery. Our app composition patterns. These pattern workflows, and the security propert preserve if their constituent servi properties. The logical connectio composition level security propertie implication rules and the reasonin properties from the latter is base properties and security implication r Our work builds upon an existing framework [17] and extends composition capabilities.
Currently, we are investigating languages, notably SAML, for exp and the development of an ontolog several granularity levels and depen
